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We use a panel of 11 EMU countries in the period 2000-2014 to assess the importance of 
political and economic determinants as explanatory factors in sovereign bond yield 
spreads. According to the results, there is evidence that those spread determinants gained 
importance after the beginning of the financial crisis. Following the crisis, the debt ratio, 
fiscal balance, expenditure on pension funds, the level of liquidity, GDP growth rate, and 
structural reforms have become relevant determinants of sovereign spreads, while fiscal 
rules have reduced spreads. 
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In some of the Eurozone countries, high living standards and consumption were 
maintained through the accumulation of significant amounts of debt, benefiting from the 
creation of the EMU, with low interest rates, and the absence of exchange rate risk and 
inflation. However, despite the increase of domestic demand can stimulate the growth of 
GDP, if the production volume to be overcome by the debt service, the public debt 
dynamic could follow an unsustainable path, generating a risk default.  
In 2009, during the financial crisis, the deterioration of the Greek public accounts 
prompted the markets to the risk of a possible default and to the consequent contagion to 
other European countries. Thus, with a significant increase in interest rates and reductions 
in the rating of the respective securities by the major rating agencies, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were forced in 2010 and 2011, to request external financial assistance, being 
supported by commonly called Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank 
and International Monetary Fund), under the then newly created European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). 
In this context, the control of public debt interest rates (and its determinants) has 
become a priority for the policy makers, to ensure the relative stabilization of public debt. 
According to the literature, there are indications that, after the beginning of the financial 
crisis, there was a significant change in the intensity of the interest rate reaction to 
different determinants, particularly in the EMU3. 
In this article, we pretend to investigate the change in the relative importance of the 
determinants of sovereign bonds spreads of EMU countries against Germany, before and 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (October 2008), important date in the worsening 
of the financial and economic crisis, answering the question: How much the relative 
importance, magnitude and sign of the determinants of spreads changed following the 
crisis? To distinguish this work from other existing articles, this research aims to 
contribute to the literature by highlighting and analyzing the impact of some specific 
determinants, different than the traditional, related to political, institutional and structural 
factors. Then, we intend to investigate the relevance of factors such as the existence and 
rigidity of budgetary rules and political cycles to determine the spreads. Also, in a logic 
of sustainability, we intend to investigate the importance of expenditure on pension funds 
and the implementation of structural reform measures as determinants of sovereign 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Heinemann et al. (2014). 
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spreads. Thus, we intend to realize how these determinants, and the others traditionally 
addressed in the literature, explain the evolution of spreads before and after the onset of 
the crisis. 
According to the results, there is evidence that after the beginning of the international 
financial crisis, there was a significant change in the determinants of sovereign spreads, 
where political and budgetary determinants gained importance as explanatory factors. 
Moreover, following the crisis, the debt ratio, fiscal balance, expenditure on pension 
funds, the level of liquidity, GDP growth rate, and the implementation of structural 
reforms have become determinants of sovereign spreads, and in turn, the FRI has a 
positive effect on the reduction of spreads, although the results are ambiguous with 
respect to the amplification or reduction of this effect following the crisis. In addition 
there is evidence that factors such as the implementation of structural reforms helped 
decreasing sovereign spreads. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 




2.1. Cost of high levels of public debt 
The literature shows that despite the short-term stimulus on economic activity that may 
result from the accumulation of public debt, based on Keynesian theory (Elmendorf and 
Mankiw, 1999; Dunayev, 2013), from a certain level of debt, its accumulation could 
deteriorate the economic and fiscal conditions, by increasing interest rates. On the other 
hand, the dynamics of debt increase could lead to a greater budgetary control, with 
increases in taxation and reductions in public spending, with recessionary impacts on the 
economy. This indicates that there may be a relationship of non-linearity between public 
debt and economic growth (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999; Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012; Bowdler and 
Esteves, 2013). 
The relationship between the accumulation of public debt and interest rates can be 
explained, according to the neoclassical model, by the fact that the interest rates increases 
because of the reduction of savings (especially public savings), and the increase in 
aggregate demand, generating deficits, and creating an oversupply of debt securities 
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). This relationship can also be explained by the crowding 
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out effect, which results from increased liquidity demand in financial markets by the 
government, which puts pressure on interest rates in the direction of ascent. Thus, the 
higher deficits and debt levels, the higher expected increase in long-term interest rate, 
with the magnitude of this variation depending on the budget level, the economic 
environment and the impact on financial markets (Baldacci and Kumar, 2010).  
One of the most damaging macroeconomic consequences of high levels of public debt 
is the impact on sovereign bonds. In the case of debt accumulation can increase the 
distrust of investors in relation to any default risk, speculative movements may raise the 
interest rate on the bonds, thus increasing the probability of a debt crisis (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2013). In addition to the importance of interest rate on state financing, debt 
sustainability and the consequent risk of default (Tamborini, 2013; Apergis and Cooray, 
2015), a rise in the price of the sovereign funding could also affect economic activity 
serving as a reference for the financing costs of families. 
As stated Bowdler and Esteves (2013), the convergence of interest rates on debt 
securities since 1990, served as a catalyst for the sovereign debt crisis, and a major 
contributor to the excessive public deficits mainly recorded in the peripheral countries of 
Eurozone. Moreover, during the crisis, when were generated large differential in interest 
rates between economies, there were changes in capital flows caused by speculative 
movements that have guided investors to apply their funds, or in countries where interest 
rates were higher or in economies with lower risks (flight-to-quality and flight-to-safety 
phenomenon) (Bernoth et al., 2012; Ehmann and Fratzscher, 2015), leading in turn to 
greater volatility in interest rates, and consequently in the countries’ economic activity. 
Considering the incentives for the accumulation of debt, and the interdependence 
between the debts of countries that at the time, would come to join the EMU (Tamborini, 
2013), at its formation, the EMU member states have implemented new fiscal rules. 
However, because of the heterogeneity of the initial debt conditions and of interest rates, 
which involved different speeds, budgetary enforces and convergence’s rhythms, and 
despite the measures in corrective part of the SGP, not always the agreed limits have been 
met. Moreover, this heterogeneity amplified deviations during the international economic 
and financial crisis, due to the actions of discretionary fiscal policy and the automatic 






2.2. Determinants of the behavior of sovereign bonds 
According to the definition provided by Barbosa and Costa (2010, p 144), the risk 
premium of a bond will depend on idiosyncratic factors of each issuer and should 
correspond to "return required by investors for the risk that future cash flows will be 
different from the agreed due to the occurrence of a default ". Thus, the differences in the 
credit risk premium level should reflect the specific characteristics of each country, which 
will determine, with different amounts, changes in interest rates. 
To study the behavior of sovereign bonds and the assessment of their risks, will be 
necessary name the importance of rating agencies in the context of the sovereign debt 
crisis, because their ratings and the information provided had responsibilities in felt 
mistrust on the quality of sovereign bonds (Afonso et al., 2012). Regarding other 
determinants of interest rates of sovereign bonds, studies indicate that most analyzed 
indicators by investors changed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the start of 
the international financial crisis, where savers not only reassessed credit risks as the 
markets increased the risk aversion. Despite neglected the weight of public debt on GDP 
in the past, investors now pay close attention to indicators related to this variable and to 
the high recorded budget deficits, so that they have become the most analyzed indicators 
in the literature (Klepsch and Wollmershäuser 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; ECB, 2014; 
Afonso and Jalles, 2015; Esposito, 2015). This is supported by Baldacci and Kumar 
(2010) that highlight the importance of budget balance in the behavior of interest rates, 
with the magnitude of its variations depending on the initial conditions to the budgetary 
and cyclical level, and on the financial markets environment. Thus, the literature suggests 
that macroeconomic determinants, such as the public debt to GDP, budget balance and 
inflation rate to begin to explain much of the variation in interest rates of the bonds in the 
long term (Laubach, 2009; Poghosyan, 2014). 
Thus, trust and expectations on budgetary performance of each country may trigger 
large changes in interest rates on debt, worsening again the budget indicators, and so on, 
culminating in a sovereign debt crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013). Afonso and Rault 
(2015) studding the behavior of sovereign bonds, found evidence supporting this 
perspective because the determinants of long-term (resulting from the fiscal position, the 
expectations of the dynamics and debt sustainability) are explanatory of changes on 
interest's behavior. According to the authors, investors tend to consider their investments 
according to expectations on inflation rate, current account balance and the exchange rate. 
As such, Constantini et al. (2014) point to the expectations of the value of the debt ratio 
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on GDP as the main indicator of budgetary imbalances and enabler of increases in risk 
premium. 
Also, Afonso and Jalles (2015) make known the importance of economic stability for 
the control of interest rates, providing evidence that the volatility of macroeconomic 
determinants generates a worsening effect on the interest rates. Also, the importance of 
the characteristics of the securities has been referenced in the literature. Reportedly, the 
characteristics have great importance in explaining the interest rates, and have 
incentivized, over the past few years, researchers to provide a hefty amount of information 
about the stock, maturity, currency composition and contractual characteristics of 
sovereign debt to most countries of the world (Tomz and Wright, 2013). The literature 
says that debt with shorter maturities are more susceptible to distrust of investors. As 
argued Reinhart and Rogoff (2013), in addition to the fulfillment of obligations whose 
maturity matures possibly require high budget deficits, a high short-term debt may reflect 
difficulties the country may have to be financed in the long run, can foresee increases the 
tax burden and is more susceptible to distrust movements on debt sustainability. 
 
2.3. The determinants of sovereign spreads in EMU 
The interest paid by government bonds should highlight the differences both credit 
risk level (or default) as the liquidity risk of each country (Barbosa and Costa, 2010). The 
analysis performed in this article will have greater focus on credit risk, because it is this 
which shows the differences in the macroeconomic situation, political and structural view 
comparing to the German economy. 
De Grauwe and Ji (2013), thinking about the weaknesses of the Eurozone, say that the 
key to the understanding of the sovereign debt crisis relates to the structure of economic 
and monetary union (EMU). Member countries, although they issue debt in its own 
currency (euro), cannot ensure that they will have sufficient liquidity to meet 
commitments, unlike other "stand-alone countries" that control monetary policy based on 
its currency. Thus, there is a susceptibility of EMU member countries to suffer distrust 
movements. Given the concerns about the payment of obligations, for example, from a 
new recession, investors sell debt securities of the countries with more difficulties, 
increasing interest rates and leading to a liquidity flight, with the creditors seeking 
countries where investments have lower risks (flight-to-quality). This "sudden stop" may 
have generated situations where governments find themselves forced to hire much higher 
rates than previously contracted to finance the public debt expenses. 
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Caporale and Girardi (2013) warn that interest rates on bonds of the Eurozone 
countries are strongly correlated (although the markets since 2008, discriminate against 
different issuers) and the percentage of resulting variability of domestic factors in long-
term interest rates within the Eurozone is modest when compared to the result of external 
shocks. 
According to Aizenman et al. (2013) and also De Grauwe and Ji (2013), the sovereign 
bond market is more fragile in a monetary union and more susceptible to self-generated 
crises that non-member countries. It is understood by self-generated crises (self-fulfilling 
crises), crises not motivated by macroeconomic fundamentals and political, but a dynamic 
"snowball" generated by pessimistic expectations of investors (Nakamura and Yagi, 
2015). 
With the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the German economy has gained the status 
of "refuge", budgetary discipline stimulating within the union. Assigning the role of "risk-
free zone" to Germany, the literature has been using the spread between its interest rate 
compared to other countries to help quantify the risk premium relatives to the titles of 
each country in analysis (Bernoth et al., 2012). Thus, sovereign bonds spreads must be 
linked via the credit risk, with differences in the macroeconomic situation, via the 
sustainability of public finances, or via terms of risk indicators in international markets 
(Barbosa and Costa, 2010). 
According to Barbosa and Costa (2010) and Klepsch and Wollmershäuser (2011), the 
spreads against Germany since 2007 can be explained by the decrease in risk appetite due 
to the financial crisis. As such, the spreads of sovereign bonds, as well as its determinants, 
have changed significantly over time, and in the pre-crisis period, the macroeconomic 
and fiscal fundamentals did not appear to be significant to determine the registered 
spreads (Afonso et al., 2015). Thus, until the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, the risk in financial markets explained about 70% of the difference 
between interest rates. After its bankruptcy, credit quality (incorporating fiscal 
vulnerabilities and the probability of default) and liquidity characteristics have increased 
their importance on the spread by 50% (Barbosa and Costa, 2010). 
With the onset of the international financial crisis, there are many studies that try to 
explain the evolution of spreads. According Klepsh and Wollmershäuser (2011), not only 
investors reassessed credit risks, as risk aversion increased by markets, thus becoming 
one of the main determinants of the evolution of spreads. On the other hand, Klose and 
Weigert (2014) had presented empirical evidences that the sovereign bonds spreads 
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increased during the crisis due to the risk of collapse of the EMU or an exchange rate 
depreciation. Already Dewachter et al. (2015) state that fiscal fundamentals are now the 
main determinants of the existing gap in the interest rates, where the exogenous shocks 
on fiscal fundamentals have played an important role in the dynamics of rates since the 
start of the sovereign debt crisis of 2011. Santis (2014) also adds to the literature that 
liquidity flight is behind the determination of spreads across the euro area (the only 
explanatory factor in the case of the Netherlands and Finland), as well as spillovers from 
Greece contributed to its evolution. 
As exemplified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2013; p lix), for a country that has a public 
debt level that seems manageable, given their current tax revenues, growth projections 
and market interest rates. If there are fears in the market, related to the possibility of a 
populist candidate win the next election and come to increase spending, so that the debt 
becomes hard to manage, investors can suddenly sell the short debt term, and ask for huge 
rates for the country. Thus, begins a crisis. This fear has been realized and referenced in 
the literature over the past decades, as the example of Hibbs (1977) that warned of the 
consequences of changes in macroeconomic policies from partisan changes. Also, Basevi 
(2013) argues that the effects coming from political uncertainty and desynchronization of 
political cycles (with consequent changes in the governing agents) is inhibiting effective 
policy responses, greater budgetary stabilization and the implementation of structural 
measures to promote the recovery of a trajectory of growth, representing a disincentive 
to investment in their debt. 
 
3. Definitions and Methodology 
Intending to study the changes in the impact of different determinants of sovereign 
bonds following the international financial crisis, through an application to the member 
countries of the Eurozone, this study uses the 2SLS methodology in order to analyze the 
evolution, the significance, the sign and magnitude of each of the explanatory variables 
of sovereign spreads. Initially, we divided the sample into two periods: the period between 
the beginning of the new millennium and the beginning of the financial crisis (2000-
2007), and the period since then (2008-2014). In a second phase (Appendix 2), the first 
estimation robustness is tested, in contrast with the second estimation. In this, using an 
alternative procedure by including a dummy variable to identify the crisis years (taking 
as the beginning of the crisis reference, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers), we tried to 
study the changes in the impact of variables, public debt, budget balance, FRI and 
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implementation of structural reforms on sovereign spreads against Germany. In this way, 
we aim to explain the evolution of spreads on sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries 
against Germany, noting whether there was a change in the relevance of each of the 
determinants of spreads with the onset of the financial crisis. 
Beyond the variables traditionally used in this type of approach, such as an indicator 
of liquidity, public debt, budget deficit, growth rate of GDP, inflation rate and the spread 
of the previous year, we also intend to verify the relevance of a set of factors political, 
institutional and structural, less explored: the existence and intensity of fiscal policy rules 
(which can be picked up by FRI-Fiscal Rule Index of the European Commission), the 
influence of political cycles (which can be picked up by the remaining time until the next 
elections), the prospects of future development of the public debt (which can be captured 
by the future evolution of pensions, presented by the OECD), and finally, an indicator of 
structural reforms implemented by different countries (which can be captured using an 
index published by the Fraser Institute). 
Thus, we represent the explanatory spread equation as: 
 
 = ∝ + +  +  +  +  !
+ "#!$! + %&'ℎ + )*$! + +,$-.$$/
+ 0$ + 1                                            
 
According to the literature, there may be reverse causality problems between the 
spread and the explanatory variables, public debt and budget balance, making inconsistent 
the OLS estimator. Such suspicions were partially confirmed by conducting the Hausman 
test, where the budget balance presented principles of endogeneity. However, following 
a more secure way, preventing a possible endogeneity of debt that was not identified in 
the Hausman test, instrumental variables were used to correct the impact of both variables. 
Thus, it will be assumed as model assumptions, the equations of explanatory variables 
suspected of endogeneity (note that given the existing inertia in fiscal factors, variables 
were included lagged in two periods): 
 
 = 2 +  +  +  +  + &'ℎ
+ "#!$! + %$ + .         
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 = 3 +  +  +  + 
+ &'ℎ + "#!$! + % ! + )$
+ 4                                                                      
Thus, the estimation is performed using as instrumental variables, , 
, , e , using the 2SLS method (Two Stage Least 
Squares) with panel data. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, through an application for eleven Eurozone countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain) we evaluated the determinants of spreads (10 years bonds) before and after the 
beginning of the crisis, using annual data for two samples: 2000-2007 and 2008-2014 
(data description at Appendix 1). The 2SLS methodology is applied to panel data and are 
considered fixed effects by country. Once the sample covers 11 countries with longer 
Eurozone accession and were not chosen from a random population, we opted for fixed 
effects (compared to random effects models). In addition, we consider only fixed effects 
by country because, in terms of time, we had already subdivided the sample between pre- 
and post-crisis. 
 
Figure 1 - Evolution of interest rates on sovereign bonds of EMU countries (except 
Estonia, Greece and Cyprus) - monthly data from 2008 to 2013 
 
 






According to the results for the period 2000-2007 (Table 1), the variables included in 
the model explains about 95% the sovereign spread behavior in the period between 2000 
and 2007. However, only the spread in the previous year presents statistically significant 
(for 1 %), and expenditure on pension funds are also statistically significant, but only for 
a 13.5% level of significance. 
Given the results presented, we are led to believe that the values of spreads followed 
an inertial logic, where the values observed in the previous period increase the spread by 
about 1.54 percentage points (pp), for each unit increase in percentage points. 
 
Table 1 – Determinants of spreads (2SLS estimations): 2000-2007 vs. 2008-2014 













































Adj- 0.954464 0.785291 
F-Statistic 43.03406 26.82323 
Note: Average increase (in basis points) in the spread of sovereign bonds resulting from unit percentage 
change in the variables indicated (except the constant C). The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 




Studying the period 2008-2014, it is observed that the variables used in the regression 
explain the behavior of spreads on sovereign bonds at about 78.5%, where the FRI index, 
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the implementation of structural reforms, the electoral cycle and inflation does not to have 
statistically significant for a 5% significance level. 
For the variables that are statistically significant, variations of one percentage point in 
the budget balance, in expenditure on pension funds and in public debt (as a percentage 
of GDP) generates average variations of -0.36, 1.75 and 0 07 pp on the difference between 
interest rates, respectively. In turn, it will also be expected to unitary variations in the 
GDP growth rate result in a reduction of 0.2 pp in the sovereign spread. 
The value of the spread in the previous year is also significant at the 5% level, where 
each variation of one percentage point increase (on average) about 0.63 pp the spread of 
the following year. Finally, liquidity negatively influences the value of spreads: on 
average, an increase of one billion dollars traded (daily) in North American debt market 
may affect spreads in -0.56 pp. 
Compared to the existing results in the literature, there is some agreement with the 
results obtained both in signal as the most significant variables. However, there was no 
statistical significance for the FRI variables, inflation, structural reforms and electoral 
cycle in the explanation of behavior of sovereign spreads. 
Since many EMU member countries violated the limits laid down in certain budget 
rules (for example, the limits laid down in the SGP), where the pressure to promote the 
consolidation and budgetary discipline is made by lenders and the European institutions, 
the rigidity of the rules budget may have been become a key with little relevance to 
investors. Thus, it will be understandable the non-significance of the FRI index for the 
explanation of sovereign spreads. 
Also, the non-significance of the proximity of elections can be explained by the high 
number of early elections in the Eurozone countries during the international crisis, 
causing governments, for example, to increase spending in the middle of the electoral 
cycle. Thus, the impact from the electoral cycle and the fears about the probability of the 
so-called populist parties come to assume government posts, as well as inversions in 
policies and reforms in progress may not have been captured by this indicator. 
The fact that inflation was not statistically significant in explaining sovereign spreads 
may be due to the implementation of the single currency and central bank independence, 
where price stability and the maintenance of interest rates became the responsibility of an 
entity supranational. Despite the importance of this indicator for the management of 
public debt, as the conduct of monetary policy became the responsibility of the European 
Central Bank, it may no longer reflect the credibility of the national governing entities, 
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where politicians are unable to resort to monetary mechanisms to finance its economic 
activity, and generate high levels of inflation, which would reduce the public debt to GDP. 
Finally, on structural reforms, although the estimates have the same sign mentioned in 
the literature, it is difficult to understand its non-significance. We suspect that this is due 
to its correlation with the budget balance. This result will be further revised in the analysis 
of the robustness of the estimation (Appendix 2). 
 
Comparison between 2000-2007 and 2008-2014 
On the level of significance of the variables, the public debt, budget balance, 
expenditure on pensions, as well as the liquidity level increased from insignificant to 
significant statistically in the post 2008 period. 
The previous year's spread lost statistical significance in the post crisis period and 
there was a reduction in its coefficient (1.54 to 0.63). On the other hand, spending on 
pension funds become statistically significant, and with a positive sign in the spread 
explanation. 
However, given that the budget balance is one of the explanatory variables of public 
debt dynamics, and considering the high correlation between these variables, the 
estimates were repeated using DEBT and BALANCE alternately, to assess the impact of 
this correlation results. In this way, we also hope to understand if the non-significance of 
structural reforms to the explanation of spreads in the crisis period is due or not, to its 
correlation with the budget balance and debt. 
Through the estimates obtained in Table 2, for the period prior to the crisis, the results 
are consistent with those obtained in the estimations with DEBT and BALANCE (Table 
1) on the significance of the explanatory variables, except for the GDP growth rate (which 
become significant to a level of 5%), the implementation of structural reforms (passed 
5% significant), and expenditure on pension funds (became significant at 10%). 
In the period 2008-2014, the results presented are consistent with those observed in 
Table 1 on the signal, magnitude and significance of most of the explanatory variables. 
However, the implementation of structural reforms and the FRI became significant to a 
level of 5%. Thus, the data indicates that a unit change in the value of implementing 
structural reforms index reduces the spread of sovereign bonds in 2.84 percentage points. 





Table 2 – Determinants of spreads (2SLS estimations): Debt 









































Adj- 0.795256 0.874657 
F-Statistic 13.64791 24.41555 
Note: Average increase (in basis points) in the spread of sovereign bonds resulting from unit percentage 
change in the variables indicated (except the constant C). The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 
5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** and * respectively (value of the t statistic in 
parentheses). 
 
Table 3 – Determinants of spreads (2SLS estimations): Balance 









































Adj- 0,957088 0,758478 
F-Statistic 37,95571 25,81763 
Note: Average increase (in basis points) in the spread of sovereign bonds resulting from unit percentage 
change in the variables indicated (except the constant C). The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 





Again, for the period prior to the international crisis, the results of Table 3 are 
consistent with those obtained in Table 1, but now, except for the GDP growth rate, which 
presents significant to a level of 10%, but with the sign contrary to expected according to 
the literature, and the implementation of structural reforms indicator that now features 
significant to a level of 5% and with the expected (negative) sign. 
For the period 2008-2014, the results are approximate to those obtained in Table 1, but 
with a non-significant budget balance. This suggests that the impact of debt developments 
on the spread tends to be more robust than the budget balance. 
Given that, for the period after the beginning of the international crisis, the level of 
significance of structural reforms varies depending on whether it is estimated including 
DEBT or BALANCE, there is evidence to support suspicions that the discrepancy 
between the results in Table 1 (where reforms are statistically non-significant) and the 
expected result given the literature, may result from the correlation between this variable 
and the budget balance or/and the public debt (Appendix 3). 
The remaining discrepancies observed between the estimates with DEBT and 
BALANCE alternately, and the estimates with the two variables simultaneously, suggest 
that the correlation between public debt and the budget balance may influence the results 
of the regressions. Therefore, Appendix 2 shows the estimation results using DEBT and 
BALANCE alternately, but now considering the period 2000-2014 with the inclusion of 
a multiplicative dummy variable which takes the value 1 for observations between 2008 
and 2014. The goal is to ensure a greater number of observations in the estimation and 
give robustness to the results already presented. 
Observing this robustness test in Appendix 2, the results indicate that structural 
reforms, unlike previously presented, are now significant in explaining spreads, both 
before and after the crisis. However, the importance of implementing structural reforms 
has greater significance and impact on spreads after the crisis: we estimate that a unit 
change in the implementation of structural reforms indicator decrease 1.52 percentage 
points the sovereign spread in the pre-crisis period, and 2.03 pp in the post crisis period. 
Analyzing the period 2008-2014 (Table A2), we conclude that the budget balance 
becomes statistically significant as a determinant of the spreads following the crisis. This 
may highlight the growing concerns about fiscal discipline and the management of public 
debt by investors. One of the justifications for such a change may be the fact that, before 
2008, an expansionary policy could stimulate the economic activity and the profitability 
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of assets, without aggravating the spread, and after the start of the international crisis, 
concerns about the conditions for a country meet its debts overlapped this effect.  
On the other hand, and despite the fact that structural reforms do not appear 
statistically significant in the first estimation, according to the robustness tests performed 
with alternating inclusion of public debt and the budget deficit, it is suspected that this 
may result from its correlation with the budget (Appendix 3). Thus, according to the 
estimation results (excluding the budget balance as an explanatory variable), the 
implementation of structural reforms is presented as statistically significant (5%), both 
pre and post the crisis began. However, the average impact of a unit change of this index 
on the spread increased from -0.38 (2000-2007) to -2.84 percentage points, after 2008. 
According to the first estimation results, contrary to what would be expected given 
the literature, the rate of budgetary rules (FRI), the electoral cycle and the inflation wasn't 
statistically significant for a 5% significance level. However, the results, considering all 
the time sample shows that the FRI had a positive effect on the reduction of spreads, 
although this effect has diminished in the period after 2007. Also, the FRI has a negative 
impact on the spread (-1.47), which is lower in the post-crisis period (-0.44). This can be 
read as follows: fiscal rules reduce the risk of default, but since the rules were repeatedly 
violated, the credibility of these decreased following the crisis.  
It is suspected that the fact that several of the EMU member countries have violated, 
often, the limits laid down in national and supranational fiscal rules, may have led to the 
formal restrictions imposed by the budgetary rules have lost importance in investors' 
decisions. Also, the non-significance of the proximity of elections can be explained by 
the high number of early elections in the EMU countries: the impact of the election cycle, 
representing the concerns about the probability of the so-called populist parties come to 
assume government posts, and of the inversions of the policies and reforms in progress, 
may not have been in these conditions captured by this indicator. In turn, the non-
significance of the inflation could due to the implementation of the single currency and 
central bank independence, where price stability and the maintenance of interest rates 
were the responsibility of a supranational entity.  
Considering all the results, and corroborating what is pointed out in the literature, they 
indicate, robustly, that following the crisis, the debt ratio, fiscal balance, expenditure on 
pension funds, the level of liquidity, GDP growth rate, and the implementation of 
structural reforms have become determinants of sovereign spreads, and in turn, the FRI 
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has a positive effect on the reduction of spreads, although the results are ambiguous with 
respect to the amplification or reduction of this effect following the crisis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and following the subsequent international 
economic and financial crisis, increased fears about the sustainability of public finances 
in Eurozone members. Such concerns have led to a substantial increase in the sovereign 
funding costs, leaving the EMU member countries in liquidity difficulties, and leading, 
in turn, that some of these requested it foreign aid to avoid default. This was due to the 
need for greater control of the debt interest rate for countries to be able to stabilize the 
public debt and to ensure the liquidity necessary to finance government expenditure, 
including the costs of the public debt. 
As defended, for example, Heinemann et al. (2014), there are indications that, during 
the crisis, there has been a change in the relative importance of determinants (fiscal, 
macroeconomic and political-institutional framework) of the interest rates of sovereign 
bonds in the EMU.  
This paper assessed the effects from the crisis on the relevance and magnitude of these 
determinants in the EMU, using a panel composed by a group of EMU countries and 
covering two periods: pre- crisis, 2000-2007, and post-crisis 2008-2014. According to the 
results, there are evidences that there was a significant change in the importance and 
magnitude of political and budgetary variables on the sovereign spread. 
In the period prior to 2008, the spread of the previous year is the only determining 
factor (statistically significant at 1%) of the current spread. The fact that spreads are, 
largely explained by their values observed in previous years, can justify a low volatility 
of the same during the period between 2000 and 2007. 
For the post-crisis period, public debt, budget balance, the GDP growth rate, spending 
on pensions, as well as the liquidity level become statistically significant (5%) and with 
the expected signal. Accruals of a percentage point in the ratios of the budget balance, the 
expenditure on pension funds and public debt to GDP ratio produces, on average, 
variations of -0.36, 1.75 and 0.07 (pp), respectively, in the sovereign spread. In turn, unit 
variations in the GDP growth rate result in the reduction of 0.2 percentage point on the 
sovereign spreads. The spreads in the previous year also keeps as a determinant: a 
variation of 1pp increase 0.63 pp the spread of the current year. Finally, the liquidity level 
has a negative impact on the spreads, where, on average, an increase of a billion dollars 
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transacted daily in the North American debt market reduces the differential analysis in 
0.56 pp. 
According to the results, political and economic determinants, as determinants of 
sovereign bond spreads, have gained importance in the post crisis period. In the previous 
period, apparently there seems to be evidences of an environment of trust generated by 
the creation of the euro area, in particular, by the public accounts control guarantees given 
by the existence of fiscal rules and the pursuit of a common monetary policy. In addition, 
structural reforms gained relevance in explaining sovereign spreads. 
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Variables Source Period Description 
Spread FMI 2000-2014 Difference between sovereign bonds (10 
years - against Germany) 
Public Debt AMECO 2000-2014 % Of GDP - current prices (ESA 2010) 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
AMECO 2000-2014 Calculated based on GDP at Current Prices 
Election Cycle Comparative 
Political Data Set 
2000-2013 Time (years) remaining until the next 
elections 
Budget Balance EUROSTAT 2003-2014 % of GDP 
Expenditure on 
Pensions 




2000-2014 Compliance rate of budgetary rules 
Structural 
Reforms 
FRASER Institute 2000-2013 Regulation indicators in the labor market, 
credit and asset 
Liquidity SIFMA 2000-2014 Average existing daily transactions per year 
in sovereign debt markets (figures in billions 
of dollars) 




Appendix 2 - Robustness Analysis (Estimations with dummy CRISIS) 
 
Table A1 – 2SLS estimation in 2000-2014 with dummy CRISIS (DEBT) 
 
 






Appendix 3 - Correlation matrix 
 




          
SPREAD_1 0.879345 
 
1.000000           
DEBT 0.583780 
 
0.578166 1.000000          
BALANCE -0.420214 
 
-0.350801 -0.515778 1.000000         
CRISIS 0.370893 
 
0.378446 0.322680 -0.438284 1.000000        
FRI -0.125583 
 
-0.008098 -0.393663 0.269238 0.096866 1.000000       
GROWTH -0.500441 
 
-0.430380 -0.451888 0.509231 -0.590413 0.082656 1.000000      
PENSIONS 0.314839 
 
0.301155 0.594037 -0.167797 0.340923 0.040205 -0.404560 1.000000     
REFORMS -0.447809 
 
-0.305104 -0.478376 0.543894 -0.239844 0.212395 0.443676 -0.396328 1.000000    
LIQUIDITY 0.372208 
 
0.506574 0.321195 -0.312786 0.574340 0.240926 -0.381179 0.327913 -0.068764 1.000000   
ELECTIONS -0.070151 
 
-0.012752 -0.019856 -0.049742 0.016684 -0.045273 -0.058157 -0.070424 0.055379 -0.011356 1.000000  
INFLATION -0.045412 
 
-0.163938 -0.046613 0.232622 -0.113033 -0.165813 0.138450 -0.104832 -0.076458 -0.196652 0.015965 1.000000 
